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IDENTITY AND STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
Amici are professors of law who research, write, and teach in the area of intellectual property. 
Amici’s institutional affiliations are provided for identification purposes only, and imply no 
institutional endorsement of the views expressed herein.  Amici have no personal stake in the 
outcome of this case.  
Mark P. McKenna 
Notre Dame Law School 
 
Rebecca Tushnet 
Harvard Law School 
 
Yvette Joy Liebesman 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Untethered to a sufficient public policy interest, right of publicity claims have exploded 
nationwide. Plaintiffs have asserted claims against inspirational plaques featuring civil rights 
icons, Rosa and Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp., 812 F.3d 824 (11th Cir. 2016), 
artwork commemorating significant events, Moore v. Weinstein Co., LLC, 545 Fed. App’x. 405, 
407 (6th Cir. 2013); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003), Wikipedia 
edits that truthfully connected an astronaut with the watch he wore on his Moon walk, Scott v. 
Citizen Watch Co. of Am., Inc., 17-CV-00436-NC, 2018 WL 1626773 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2018), 
docudramas, de Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 21 Cal. App. 5th 845 (2018), and depictions of a 
company named for its founder, Virag, S.R.L. v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 699 Fed. App’x. 
667 (9th Cir. 2017), among many other uses. This Court has the opportunity to keep Indiana’s right 
of publicity law within more appropriate bounds by focusing on protection of performers against 
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unauthorized recordings (similar to common-law copyright, as recognized in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)) and unauthorized use of identities in advertising 
(protecting against false endorsements).   
The Court should take that opportunity, because a free-floating right of publicity operates as 
an unconstitutional, content-based regulation of otherwise truthful, protected speech. Given the 
First Amendment value of truthful, nondefamatory speech, courts should not lightly give the 
subjects of such speech control over it. Thus, the right of publicity must be carefully limited to 
avoid becoming a right to control public discourse. Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 
46, 50 (1988) (refusing to allow the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to evade the 
strict requirements of defamation as applied to editorial speech). Although the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance might justify finding that these defendants’ activities do not fall within 
the scope of the Indiana statute, the statute is unconstitutional to the extent that it goes beyond 
advertising and unauthorized recordings of performances. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. The Statutory Right of Publicity is a Content-Based Regulation of 
Noncommercial and Commercial Speech That Cannot Survive Strict 
Scrutiny 
 
A. The Indiana Statute Regulates Speech on the Basis of Its Content  
As written, the Indiana statute, which prohibits use of an aspect of a personality’s right of 
publicity for a “commercial purpose,” covers far more than commercial speech.1 Commercial 
                                                 
1 Ind. Code § 32-36-1-2 (2017) defines “commercial purpose” to be use “(1) On or in connection 
with a product, merchandise, goods, services, or commercial activities; (2) For advertising or 
soliciting purchases of products, merchandise, goods, services, or for promoting commercial 
activities; (3) For the purpose of fundraising.”  Only (2) is commercial speech; (1) would generally 
be noncommercial speech, e.g., a biography of a public figure, while (3) would generally be 
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speech is not any speech that is sold in the market or that is supported by advertising, but rather 
“speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” United States v. United Foods, 
Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001). Some commercial speech doesn’t directly propose an immediate 
commercial transaction, but there is nonetheless a fundamental difference between, on the one 
hand, speech that aims to convince a listener to provide a separate economic benefit to the speaker, 
and on the other hand, speech that is itself the product or service being sold. The latter is not 
commercial speech, despite its potential commercial effects. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) (holding that “expression by means of motion pictures is 
included within the free speech and free press guaranty” in the Constitution, even though 
filmmaking “is a large-scale business conducted for private profit”); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983) (holding that economic motivation for speech by itself does not 
make speech commercial); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
defendant’s novel fell “within the protection of the First Amendment” whether it was “viewed as 
an historical or fictional work,” so long as it was “not simply a disguised commercial advertisement 
for the sale of goods or services”). FanDuel’s product, like that of other fantasy sports leagues, is 
information about the players, just as speech is the product sold by newspapers and video games. 
FanDuel is not using information about players to advertise another product or invite some other 
commercial transaction. 
To enforce the right of publicity statute, a court must examine the content of the challenged 
speech to determine whether it uses one of the protected types of personal identifiers (name, voice, 
signature, etc.). Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (a speech regulation is content 
                                                 
noncommercial speech, see Riley v. Natl. Fedn. of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2667, 
2673 (1988).  
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based when it cannot be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech”); see 
also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765–66 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality opinion) 
(“[t]he First Amendment guards against laws ‘targeted at specific subject matter,’ a form of speech 
suppression known as content based discrimination.”) (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 
S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015)). Under the First Amendment, such content-based restrictions are 
subjected to strict scrutiny. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (content-based 
speech regulation subject to the highest level of scrutiny); Sable Comm’ns of California, Inc. v. 
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (content-based speech restrictions must be narrowly drawn to serve 
a compelling government interest). 
As the Ninth Circuit has already recognized in a similar situation, “California’s right of 
publicity law clearly restricts speech based upon its content.” Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 
903 (9th Cir. 2016). California’s law is therefore “presumptively unconstitutional and may only 
be justified if the government proves that [it is] narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests.” Id. at 903–04; see also In re Brunetti 877 F.3d 1330, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (reaching 
same conclusion with respect to federal statutory bar on trademark registration that covered 
noncommercial speech). The Ninth Circuit noted that the motion picture in Sarver was “fully 
protected by the First Amendment, which safeguards the storytellers and artists who take the raw 
materials of life—including the stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary—and 
transform them into art, be it articles, books, movies, or plays,” and concluded that the plaintiff’s 
claim could not survive strict scrutiny. Sarver, 813 F.3d at 905–06. (As the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged, its earlier right of publicity precedents did not consider this constitutional test.  Id. 
at 903–906.)   
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The same analysis applies here, at least as to those parts of the right of publicity statute that go 
beyond regulating commercial speech.2   
 
B. The Indiana Statute Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny 
Under strict scrutiny, a speech restriction must be narrowly tailored to a compelling 
government interest. U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  The First 
Amendment reflects the priority of speech: the speaker doesn’t need to justify her speech or 
convince the court of its value. Rather, the government must justify its suppression of that speech, 
or its decision to make the speech hostage to the consent of a private censor. The state cannot meet 
that burden here. Simply put: There is no compelling state interest in stamping out discussions of 
people and imaginative reconstructions of sports teams, whether or not those discussions are 
conducted for profit.   
Several justifications of the right of publicity have been offered; none legitimately extends to 
the noncommercial speech at issue here. The right of publicity, because it has no likelihood of 
confusion requirement, is “potentially more expansive than [federal trademark law],” Rogers v. 
Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989). The interests furthered by the right of publicity are 
also less significant than those furthered by trademark law—the right of publicity as applied to 
noncommercial speech protects the private interests of celebrities, whereas trademark law’s 
protection from consumer confusion about endorsement protects the interests of the entire 
consuming public as well as of trademark holders. See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major 
                                                 
2 It might be possible, in the name of constitutional avoidance, to interpret the exclusions in the 
statute to cover all noncommercial speech. In particular, the Court could interpret the exclusion of 
“material that has … newsworthy value” to include FanDuel’s use. See Ind. Code § 32-36-1-
1(c)(1)(B). 
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League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that celebrities 
can protect their economic interests by controlling sponsorships and blocking confusing 
commercial uses, and that any noneconomic interests in controlling truthful reporting about their 
performances do not justify suppressing truthful speech). As the C.B.C. court reasoned, “the 
information used in [the games] is all readily available in the public domain, and it would be 
strange law that a person would not have a first amendment right to use information that is 
available to everyone.”  Id. at 823. 
Celebrities and professional athletes have more than adequate incentives to pursue their crafts 
without the government giving them a monopoly on the use of their names and likenesses in 
expressive works.  See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can 
Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187–88 (2006) (noting that there is “[n]ot a 
shred of empirical data” showing that celebrities are incentivized by publicity rights because they 
are already “handsomely compensated,” and observing that, in any event, “it is not at all clear that 
society should want to encourage fame for fame’s sake”); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of 
Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 260–63 (2005) (noting that 
celebrities have significant incentives to invest in their primary fields and in their personas even 
absent a right of publicity, particularly since they would still have false endorsement claims in 
cases where there is a risk of confusion); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of 
Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 910–11 (2003) (the right of publicity provides at most a “small 
speculative increase” in the incentive to become famous); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg 
Productions, 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (“[n]o author should be forced 
[by threat of a right-of-publicity claim] into creating mythological worlds or characters wholly 
divorced from reality.”).   
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Limiting the right of publicity to commercial speech would also be consistent with its the 
traditional scope. Depictions of real people, in any non-advertising medium, have long been 
understood to be protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824 (use of 
athletes’ identities in fantasy sports leagues protected by First Amendment); ETW, 332 F.3d at 938 
(use of professional golfer’s likeness in prints sold for profit protected by First Amendment); 
Matthews, 15 F.3d at 440 (use of undercover police officer’s identity in film protected by First 
Amendment); Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1005 (use of Fred Astaire’s and Ginger Rogers’ first names in 
movie title protected by First Amendment); cf. Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 
802, 808 (Fla. 2005) (concluding that allowing right of publicity claim based on use of events from 
plaintiff’s life in film would “raise[] a fundamental constitutional concern”). 
The uses of athletes’ names and other information at issue here is the same as that which would 
be used in any biography, docudrama, speculation about seasons to come, or other form of speech. 
The right to control discussion or use of a public figure’s publicly available information is a 
dangerous one. Those who are the participants in newsworthy and historical events could censor 
and write the story and their descendants could do the same. This would be anathema to the core 
concept of free speech and a free press.  See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY 
& PRIVACY § 8:64 (2d ed. 2017); see also Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 Cal. App. 4th 664, 
677 (2010) (holding that a five-page editorial about indie rock concerned topics of public interest 
simply because it discussed “an extremely popular genre of music [and included] commentary on 
the many bands whose musical works have contributed to the development of the genre”); Sarver, 
813 F.3d at 902 (concluding that a film’s portrayal of the Iraq War implicated matters of public 
concern).   
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This same broad constitutional protection consistently has been applied to misappropriation 
and right-of-publicity claims purporting to arise from fictional or dramatized works, and for good 
reason—such media are often important parts of shaping how public figures are remembered, 
whether it’s Ronald Reagan as George Gipp in Knute Rockne, All American or Laurence Fishburne 
as Ike Turner in What’s Love Got To Do With It.3 In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 
Justice Bird of the California Supreme Court explained:  
Whether the publication involved was factual and biographical or fictional, the right of 
publicity has not been held to outweigh the value of free expression. Any other conclusion 
would allow reports and commentaries on the thoughts and conduct of public and 
prominent persons to be subject to censorship under the guise of preventing the dissipation 
of the publicity value of a person’s identity. Moreover, the creation of historical novels and 
other works inspired by actual events and people would be off limits to the fictional author. 
An important avenue of self expression would be blocked and the marketplace of ideas 
would be diminished.  
 
Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 461–62 (Bird, J., concurring). Fictionalization is even common in political 
discourse: Maureen Dowd and Aaron Sorkin wrote an editorial in which the fictional Jed Bartlett 
discusses the 2008 election with the very real Barack Obama, Maureen Dowd, Aaron Sorkin 
Conjures a Meeting of Obama and Bartlet, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/opinion/21dowd-sorkin.html. More recent stories have 
imagined conversations between elected officials, Elizabeth Preza, GOP official imagines Kelly 
                                                 
3 Although fantasy sports might seem less significant than other media in shaping understanding 
of public figures, that is neither a judgment that courts are equipped to make under the First 
Amendment nor a stable fact.  See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (explaining that 
both entertainment and news are fully protected by the First Amendment because “[t]he line 
between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right”). 
Consider a player who is removed from a team for refusing to stand for the National Anthem, or 
one who is suspended for an incident of domestic violence—both situations that have made 
national headlines in the past few years. If the players have the right to control their appearance in 
fantasy sports, they also have the right to condition that approval on avoiding any negative 
mentions of players’ behavior. 
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and Mattis Discussed Tackling Trump if He ‘Lunges for the Nuclear Football,’ RAW STORY (Oct. 
10, 2017), https://www.rawstory.com/2017/10/kelly-and-mattis-discussed-literally-tackling-
trump-in-the-event-he-lunges-for-the-nuclear-football-report/.   
Fantasy sports are a newer variety of fictionalization, but their novelty should not obscure their 
status as speech, and the corresponding need for the government to articulate a compelling 
interest—not just a private interest in transferring control from the speaker to the subject of the 
speech—in order to regulate them. As long as fictionalization is nondefamatory, it is protected by 
the First Amendment as a form of commentary on real-world events and people. The right of 
publicity should not be expanded to threaten this non-advertising speech. 
 
II. Zacchini Provides No Warrant for Extending the Right of Publicity to 
the Defendants’ Conduct  
 
While Zacchini allows a “right of publicity” lawsuit in the context of noncommercial speech, 
that extremely narrow decision depended on circumstances not applicable here. The Supreme 
Court consistently characterized the conflict in Zacchini as one between the television station’s 
First Amendment rights and the performer’s interest in his “entire act”—equivalent to a common-
law copyright, not a conventional right of publicity claim.  Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.4  
                                                 
4 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (“the State’s interest [in permitting a right of publicity] is closely 
analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law”); id. at 575 (“The Constitution no more 
prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on 
television than it would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work 
without liability to the copyright owner.”); id. at 576 (“the same consideration underlies the patent 
and copyright laws long enforced by this Court”); MCCARTHY, supra, at § 11:55 (“The proper 
category for Zacchini’s claim was the state law of common law copyright, not the right of 
publicity.”); Dogan & Lemley, supra, at 1187 (same); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits 
of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 1343, 1365 n.97 (1989) (same); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right 
of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. 35, 49–50 & n.43 (1998) (same); cf. Comedy III 
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The Court suggested that use of Zacchini’s entire act posed a “substantial threat to the 
economic value of that performance.” Id. But this concern was quite specific to broadcasting of 
the entire performance. See id. at 573 n.10 (emphasizing that Zacchini did not “merely assert that 
some generally use, such as advertising, was made of his name or likeness; he relie[d] on the much 
narrower claim that respondent televised an entire act that he ordinarily gets paid to perform”).  
Indeed, the Court emphasized that “the broadcast of [Zacchini’s] entire performance, unlike the 
unauthorized use of another’s name for purposes of trade or the incidental use of a name or picture 
by the press, goes to the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an entertainer.” Id. at 576. 
Thus, according to the Court, “Ohio ha[d] recognized what may [have been] the strongest case for 
a ‘right of publicity’—involving, not the appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to enhance 
the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the very activity by which the entertainer acquired 
his reputation in the first place.”  Id.  
This case does not involve anything like use of the Appellants’ “entire acts,” and it does not 
involve a performance in which Appellants could have a common-law copyright.  
 
III. Categorical Protection for Noncommercial Speech Against Right of 
Publicity Claims is Superior to the Alternatives.  
 
In the absence of a recorded performance to which Zacchini would apply, a defendant cannot 
be subject to liability for noncommercial speech about a matter of public interest that is not false 
or defamatory. No other balancing or set of exceptions is necessary. This bright-line approach 
                                                 
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 806 (Cal. 2001) (“Zacchini was not an ordinary 
right of publicity case: the defendant television station had appropriated the plaintiff’s entire act, 
a species of common law copyright violation.”). 
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avoids the chilling effects, unpredictability, and risks of mistake otherwise caused by attempts to 
apply more detailed exemptions such as those listed in the statute, which require courts to weigh 
incommensurable and unmeasurable free speech interests against a plaintiff’s inchoate interests in 
“controlling” his or her public presentation. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) 
(“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech 
that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself 
reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government 
outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the 
basis that some speech is not worth it.”).5 
Amici believe that categorical protection for truthful noncommercial speech is superior to 
alternate approaches that require courts to parse already First-Amendment protected speech for 
“material that has political or newsworthy value” or to evaluate the form of a nondefamatory work 
to determine whether it constitutes a “literary” work or other work exempted by the statute, Ind. 
Code § 32-36-1-1(c)(1)(A)–(B).6 This rule avoids content discrimination based on the court-
determined merit of the speech or the person depicted, so long as the speech is noncommercial. 
                                                 
5 See also Stevens, 559 U.S. at 479 (“Most of what we say to one another lacks ‘religious, political, 
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value’ (let alone serious value), but it is 
still sheltered from government regulation.”). 
6 Notably, the Indiana statute exempts “literary” works but not equally fully First Amendment-
protected video games, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). It 
also exempts “original” fine art but not copies of fine art, such as lithographs, posters made of 
paintings, or numbered prints. Ind. Code § 32-36-1-1(c)(1)(A), (C). This kind of medium 
discrimination lacks a compelling interest as well, and further shows that, while the law may have 
been tailored to protect some currently powerful industries, it is not narrowly tailored for First 
Amendment purposes. 
Brief of Amici Curiae 




For the foregoing reasons, Amici respectfully request that the Court limit application of 
the Indiana statute to advertising and unauthorized recordings of performances.  
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